Abstract: Against the backdrop of a growing national and international accountability movement in education outcomes, this study sets up a simple model of yardstick competition with incumbent-disciplining effects through voters comparing performance measures of public education both across nations and federal states. It implies a potential strategic dilemma where a single top-performance state can block reform measures that could benefit low-performance states more than would do for itself. The linchpin predictions of the model are tested by analyzing announcement effects of student achievement tests on vote and popularity (VP) functions of German national and state government incumbents.
Introduction
In general, the formal education system of a federal political system acts as the primary source of literacy and numeracy acquisition. Literacy and, in particular, numeracy significantly determine labor market outcomes of individuals; see, e.g., Charette and Meng (1998) . In reality, we observe hybrid forms of federal governance in public education, i.e. forms that are neither strictly decentralized nor strictly centralized. Political decisions on educational standards in a federation of jurisdictions are generally taken in a parliamentary chamber representing the second-tier jurisdictions. In an international context, this is for example the Senate of Canada for Canada or the Bundesrat for Germany.
Recently, Germany reformed its federal structures in 2006 to a less standardized organization of the formal education system. Major parts of decision-making authorities have been allocated from the upper-tier government (Bund) to the lower-tier governments of federal states (Laender). For public schooling an implication is decentralization and an imminent heterogeneity with regard to some structural cornerstones such as tracking norms or the classification of education levels. The opposite applies, for example, to Switzerland, where the advisory board of education directors in the 26 cantons 1 opted for a reform designed to "harmonize" and standardize existing cantonal education practices. The so-called HarmoS reform program was enacted in 2009 in the form of a legally binding state treaty. Among others, it defines superordinate targets for compulsory schooling, sets out guidelines of quality assurance, and decrees mandatory educational standards across cantons. Thus, while Switzerland moves away from a purely decentralized form of federal governance of the education system, Germany seems to move toward it. Actually, more than ever in its post-war history German education seems to consist of 16 states sharing the same cultural and legal system but pursuing idiosyncratic education policies (Schulte 2004; Wössmann 2010) . According to Goldin and Katz (2001) the high school movement, establishing the US twentieth-century leadership in human capital (Goldin 2001; by rigorously expanding secondary school to the masses and spreading over the Western world in the post-war decades will be replaced by an extensive accountability movement of education in the twenty-first century. Against this background of growing accountability, transparency, benchmarking, and yardstick competition both at the provincial or federal and national levels, the question of optimal allocation of public education responsibilities has not been thoroughly addressed in the economic literature. In particular, it is unclear whether a federal government should decide for either one of the polar forms of governance (centralized or decentralized) or for a hybrid form of governance, where some rights that are more or less residual in nature are left at either the government or the provincial level.
Our study addresses this question from a political economy perspective for a two-tiered government in a representative democracy. To this end we set up a simple model of political yardstick competition (Salmon 1987; Besley and Case 1995; Sand-Zantman 2004; Bodenstein and Ursprung 2005) with a Salmon mechanism both at the upper-tier as well as at the lower-tier government level. In our model voters are assumed to compare performance measures of public education both across nations and across federal states. Voting is supposed to be the main incentive mechanism to discipline incumbents with regard to an efficient education policy. This is achieved by voters appraising incumbent governments' relative performances. The model results in a strategic dilemma as a single state belonging to the top flight in terms of its students' test achievements can block Pareto-improving policies if they imply lost grounds in the pecking order for this particular state. We find evidence for the central drivers behind this finding, i.e., for relative performances in student achievement tests impacting on vote and popularity (VP) functions of German national and state government incumbents.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the route from yardstick competition to strategic dilemma for the hybrid form of federal governance in German public education policy and sets out our model. The empirical strategy and findings are outlined and discussed in Section 3. Finally, Section 4 discusses and concludes.
From Yardstick Competition to Strategic Dilemma

The International Accountability Movement
In the following, we consider the national extensions of the OECD Programme of International Student Assessment (PISA) studies to illustrate the international accountability movement, in particular, at the subnational level of federally organized nations. The PISA studies underlie a standardized test of 15-yearolds' literacy in reading, math, and science. As of 2000, the OECD repeated the test every 3 years. In Germany, the national extensions of the worldwide test are referred to as PISA-E or Laendervergleich. They test the cognitive achievement of representative samples of 15-year-old students as a general rule also in math, science, and reading literacy. Habitually, the national extensions use the same tests as the international PISA study. The sample size of the German extension of the PISA test is several times the one of the international test comprising two overlapping samples of 15-year-olds and ninth graders. Each sample covers about 40,000 students made of state samples ranging from 1,600 to 5,000 students for the 16 German federal states. Results are published several months after the international test results. Performance at the state level is measured on a standardized scale as is the case at the supranational level. For any OECD nation participating in PISA and/or testing at the level of state or province, scores for each subject and year are for the sake of comparability centered to an OECD mean of 500 and a standard deviation of 100.
In general, models of yardstick competition (Salmon 1987; Besley and Case 1995; Sand-Zantman 2004; Bodenstein and Ursprung 2005) assume voters to make comparisons between jurisdictions. In this type of models voting is the main incentive mechanism to discipline incumbents with regard to an efficient policy, for example, to an efficient education policy. Voters discipline incumbent governments by appraising their relative performance. This mechanism requires transparency, in the sense that voters can gain access to information about what other incumbents are doing and the corresponding achievements of some other entities' students to serve as a benchmark for their own incumbent government's policy. These entities can be nations or federal entities such as federal states or provinces. As regards the OECD PISA test and its regional extensions, full information on student achievement even just at the state level is generally rather the exception than the rule in an international comparison of federally organized countries (Table 1) . Frequently also confidentiality requirements preclude the use of student-level data across states as is the case for German Laender. Yet, for example, in Germany Laender-comparing PISA-E tests are widely published and extensively discussed in the media and in political debates (Tillmann et al. 2008; Pütz 2008 ).
Hybrid Forms of Federal Governance: Germany
In this section we give a brief overview of the highly idiosyncratic federal structures of secondary education policy in Germany. This might seem at odds with official political parameters as school policy is formally under exclusive Laender jurisdiction through the constitutional premise of Laender "cultural sovereignty" (Kulturhoheit) according to Article 30 of the German Basic Law (Grundgesetz). Additionally, Article 79(iii) stipulates that the federal character of the German Republic, Article 20(i), cannot be altered even not by constitutional amendment. However, Article 70 of the Basic Law states that the Laender have the ability to exercise governmental responsibilities only as far as the Basic Law does not provide or allow for any other arrangements or confer legislative power to the federal government. Thus, in fact, German (secondary) education policy is a "matter of subsidiarity" coined by non-constitutional institutional arrangements (Niemann 2009) bypassing to some extent the federal division of responsibilities (Erk 2003, 310) . Hence, modification of the cultural sovereignty and the putatively exclusive jurisdiction of states is possible through implementation and legal interpretation which is justified, e.g., by extra-constitutional moral principles. Erk (2003) sees the emergence of an "all-German" education policy in a system of exclusive provincial jurisdiction in four major circumstances: the rather artificial coming-into-being of German states, a strong public demand for harmonization and standardization following patterns of path dependency, 2 no ethno-linguistic diversity (as given, for example, for Switzerland, Belgium, Spain, and Canada), and -similar to Austria and Australia -no distinct provincial "identity" in general. Against this backdrop, some critical political scientists refer to the German form of federalism as an "interlocking system of functional federalism," a "federal state with a non-federal society," or even a "unitary federal state" (Erk 2003; Niemann 2009 ). In the context of contemporary German education policy, labels like "co-operative cultural federalism" or federal governance with a federal government endowed with "participatory rights" are quite convenient among political scientists. Regarding the finance of education, Germany originally installed a separate system (Trennsystem) for Laender and Bund. Nevertheless, up to the late 1950s the unwritten extra-constitutional principles of "federal friendly behavior" (bundesfreundliches Verhalten) and "federal comity" (Bundestreue) given through Federal Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht) rulings guided education policy in practice. In 1955, the fiscal scheme changed to financial equalization (Länderfinanzausgleich), where income tax, corporate income tax, and value-added tax revenues are both horizontally shared among the Laender and vertically between Laender and Bund.
Interestingly, Erk (2003) 2 German education policy before World War II can be divided into three regimes (Niemann 2009 ): exclusive authority of the Laender during the German Empire (1871-1919), followed by a first nationwide framework of education policy in the Weimar Republic (1919 Republic ( -1933 and a complete abusive centralization during the Nazi regime. After the German defeat, some schools started teaching again on the basis of the relatively centralized Weimar principles at the end of the year 1945, that is, before the allies' efforts to restructure the German education system following principles of democratization and re-education took effect. 3 The Standing Conference unites the ministers and senators of the states responsible for education, higher education and research as well as cultural affairs. It was founded on the initiative of representatives of all the zones of occupation in 1948/49, i.e. before the Federal Republic of Germany was actually constituted. dropped the parts of its charter that contained the adherence to the clear-cut division of responsibilities of Laender and Bund in all its decisions. De jure, KMK resolutions and recommendations are formally not legally binding for Laender but require state legislation to be put into practice. However, since decisions are based on the principle of unanimity, they have de facto applicability. Many committees, commissions, and agreements followed in the German post-war history (Erk 2003, 303-13) . Most of them implied a standardization of the input side of education across states. For example, the Düsseldorf Agreement of 1955 standardized educational assessment, timing and duration of the study year, curricula and recognition of qualifications in order to ease the substantial state-to-state migration at the time. In 1969 by transforming the existing federal Ministry of Scientific Research into the Ministry of Education and Science (BMBF) the federal government created a ministry in a policy area where it officially does not have a constitutional jurisdiction. One year later, the BundLaender-Kommission für Bildungsplanung und Forschungsförderung (BLK) established. It was the first official joint body of decision-making as it included the federal government as partner of the Laender. Since the time, the focus of concerted education policy of Laender and Bund has been on educational planning and the joint promotion, organization, and evaluation of nationwide pilot projects. In early 1991 the Western structures of the education system were imposed on the newly created East German Laender. Since the second half of the 1990s, joint educational planning efforts have led to a series of output-oriented education standards across Laender. In the first half of the 2000s, on initiative of the KMK the Laender and the federal government established a central agency of monitoring compliance with education standards (Institute for Educational Progress, IQB) and committed themselves to systematically evaluating the output side, i.e., in particular, student performance in standardized assessments. In mid-2006 the first stage of reform of German federalism (Föderalismusreform) dissolved the Bund-Laender joint task ("Gemeinschaftsaufgabe") of education planning including the suspension of financial support from the federal government, e.g., for the construction of school buildings. In the present paper, we will focus on the first half of the 2000s up to 2006, which witnessed a regime of hybrid decision-making in German education policy.
Summing up the status quo for our period of analysis, the federal structure of the German education system is coined by collective decision-making with institutionalized veto power of each federal state. The federal level (e.g. through the BMBF) mainly has its competences in coordinating educational planning in cooperation with the Laender. Decision-making in education policy at the federal level requires consensus among each of the federal states. Thus, overarching decision-making is formally highly vulnerable to the veto power of each single state in the German Council, i.e., the house of the German parliament that represents the lower-tier state governments (Bundesrat) and in committees, i.e., in particular, in the KMK and in the Conference of the Prime Ministers (MPK) of the Laender. Additionally, it can be influenced by the formal veto points of (constitutional) courts in the Laender; see Niemann (2009, 5) . A final caveat concerns indirect hybrid decision-making through a supranational channel: Although the European Commission (EC) follows a so-called soft law strategy, which seeks to protect national sovereignty and to keep EC influence as low as possible, it is the German federal government (Article 32(i), Basic Law) that represents German interests in Brussels, including education. Obviously, this circumstance counteracts the formal supremacy of states in this policy area; see Walkenhorst (2005) . In sum, the usual policy process consists of proposals made at the federal government and/or centralized committee level and/or indirectly by an adopted recommendation at the supranational level. In any case, proposals require a unanimity vote by the Laender to get approved. 4 For our period of analysis a prominent example of a non-approved policy is the proposed nationwide dilution of the tripartite German school structure planned to be complemented by the introduction of a comprehensive school (Gesamtschule) track across states. The existing tripartite system separates students fairly early, usually at the age of 10 or 11 years, according to their abilities in different school types. Its opponents, thus, display it as prone to inequity. Niemann (2009) argues that this proposal, representing an indirect recommendation of the OECD, actually is an example for a proposal implicitly stemming from the indirect supranational channel described above. Modifying or even abolishing the tripartite system was not approved by the state of Bavaria and, hence, not uniformly realized at the federal level. An example of unanimously approved policies is binding education standards for intermediate school graduation (Mittlere Reife) in subjects reading, math, and first foreign language in 2004. The standards have been extended to subjects physics, chemistry, and biology as well as to secondary general schools and primary school leavers in 2005. Another example is the approval of the German orthography reform passed by the KMK in 1995. It was enacted -after some individual adjustment period for some states -nationwide as of the end of 2006. A substantial program with total costs amounting to approximately four billion Euros that was approved by all states and realized nationwide from 2003 to 2011 is the all-day school program (Ganztagsschulprogramm). It required, among others, the massive construction of canteens and re-arrangements of public transport for students in some of the Laender. A further unanimously approved policy is the reform of the KMK and its operating range in 2004 with its cornerstones output orientation, streamlining of core administrative tasks and processes, and centralizing competences of international and European Union-wide student exchange. Also the joint initiative of Bund and Laender to test the female Muslim teacher's scarf wearing ban (originating in legal action at the administrative court of the state of Baden-Württemberg) at the Bundesverfassungsgericht in 2003 is an example. It was seen as necessary in order to find a solution applicable in all German states. Finally, a proposal from the indirect supranational channel and at the interface of secondary and higher education policy that was approved, too, is the re-structuring and harmonization of teacher training across states. It was part of the European "Bologna Reform" process and realized in gradual steps in the second half of the 2000s.
Let us briefly turn to the alternatives of hybrid decision-making. Proponents of a decentralized structure with full autonomy at the federal state level argue along the following lines.
5 A centralization or harmonization in the sense of nationwide agreeing on and setting of binding educational norms, for instance, in the form of a minimum average student achievement in standardized tests, would necessarily lead to a substandard decree (Schwager 2005) . This unavoidable result is attributed to an externality of democratic decision-making inherent to the federal system. The argument is simple and can straightforwardly be illustrated by the following scenario of a hypothetical majority vote on a subordinate target value for student performance in the Bundesrat. Suppose that for reasons of an unspecified x-inefficient inertia each federal state wants to stick to its realized (average) level of student performance and proposes the respective figure as the new superordinate target. The total number of seats in the council corresponds to the accumulated number of votes of states. Seats range from three to six, depending on the size of population in the respective Bundesland. In total, seats and corresponding votes in the council sum up to 69. As can be seen from Table 2 , the highest educational standard capable of winning an absolute majority (!35 votes) in the Bundesrat would correspond to the proposal made by the council members of the state of Hesse (H), Rhineland-Palatinate (RP), and Brandenburg (BB) for PISA-E tests in 2000, 2003, and 2006, respectively. In all three cases, the correspondingly proposed standard would fall below both the average student performance of all test-participating states (penultimate row in Table 2 ) and the German students' average performance in the international test (ultimate row in Table 2 ) for the respective test year. 6 As can be seen from Figure 1 ).
Hybrid Forms of Federal Governance: A Basic Model
In the following basic model, we assume voters to compare states both at the national as well as at the supra-national level with regard to one of their major concerns: a successful education policy. As in the seminal models by Table 2 : German Laender PISA-E performances and seats in the Bundesrat. Salmon (1987) and Besley and Case (1995) , voting is the main incentive mechanism to discipline incumbents in order to follow a best practice education policy. To this end, we assume voters to be able to appraise incumbents' relative performance. This is a reasonable assumption as voters have access to information about the educational success of other incumbents both in a national and international comparison of student achievement rankings based on standardized tests such as PISA-E and PISA. This fact forces incumbents both at the federal state level and at the national level into a yardstick competition in which they care about what other incumbents are doing. A straightforward rationalization of this fact is first to let the reelection probability of both the upper-tier government U and lower-tier government L depend on the relative performance of students in an international (OECDwide) and national (across federal states) comparison of student cognitive achievement, respectively. Hence, let
where f 0 > 0, i.e., the reelection probability of the national (n) incumbent uppertier government U increases with an above worldwide (w) average performance of students; μ n a ;
1 F P F i¼1 a i for i ¼ 1; . . . ; F federal states, where a is denoting achievement, and μ where again f 0 > 0, i.e., the reelection probability of the incumbent lower-tier government L in state i increases with an above national (n) average performance of students.
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Residual or "participatory" rights of U are such that the upper-tier government is allowed to make proposals with regard to education policies that federal governments i can either accept or reject. However, as the proposal requires unanimity to pass, U has an incentive to make only a subset of Pareto efficient proposals, that is, only proposals that make every state better off, i.e., a i;1 > a i;0 for all i ¼ 1; . . . ; F federal states, where index 1 denotes all periods after and 0 all periods before the reform is enacted. The reform suggested by U will not be approved when policy vector a i f g F i¼1 is perceived as engineered by the proposal in a way that achievements in only a subset of states will improve. As the reelection probability of states ‚ this subset necessarily falls, these states will refuse their vote. However, even the qualifying subset of Pareto efficient proposals that makes each federal state better off is not guaranteed to get approved.
There will be a strategic dilemma if for a federal state with a
i.e., if one state of the leading group of states expects the national average of student achievements to grow faster and, hence, the bottom group to catch up faster than the top students' states advance. Put it differently, in growth rate notation, the dilemma sets in for
where T denotes end of incumbent period. In this case, where the national average student achievement increases by more than the state-mean of student test scores increases in, at least, one of the leading group of states, even the allstates better-off scenario fails. This is due to the fact that, at least, one of the above national average performing states improves its performance index by less than student performances in below-average performing states would be improved. As it is the relative difference that matters with regard to the reelection probability of a federal state incumbent government (eq.
[2]), the proposal might end up being not unanimously approved. In sum, although U might only propose strong Pareto-improving policies for the federally organized public education system, a strategic dilemma at the L-level can prevent the realization of these policies. The reason for this rather cynical result or behavior lies in the fact that U does neither internalize VP function [2] of L in the sense of a Nash equilibrium nor consider any distributional concerns across Laender in its objective function. However, the fact that Bavaria of all states did not approve the reform proposal of the dilution of the tripartite German school structure (perceived as prone to inequity) sketched in Section 2.2 may serve as some indicative evidence of such behavior. As can be seen from Table 2 , Bavaria always ranked among the top 2 states in the PISA-E state performance ranking between 2000 and 2006. Bavarian officials' justification of their state acting as a veto player in this decision is twofold. First, it is argued that the Bavarian school system does not need to be reformed as it achieves top results in the national comparisons despite -or even because of -its strict system of separating students at relatively young age (Niemann 2009, 20-21) . Second, Bavarian politicians also justify their position in this matter by pointing to the substantial cost of the reform. Following their argument, the cost would have to be beared to a relatively large extent by Bavarian taxpayers as Bavaria is used to be a net payer in the fiscal equalization scheme since the 1970s.
The linchpin mechanism of our basic model possibly implying the above sketched strategic dilemma for hybrid forms of federal governance consists of eqs 
Evidence
In the following, we rely on polls data on stated voting intention to gauge actual voting intentions and the popularity of ruling parties in Germany. Ultimately, we use these data to proxy the reelection probability of incumbent governments. This is a frequent practice of the empirical strand of the political economy literature; see Kirchgässner (1985) for German federal elections, Carlsen (1997) for the United States, and Wolfers and Leigh (2002) for federal elections in Australia. Wolfers and Leigh (2002) comparing popularity polls outcomes with projections from economic models and betting market data find that polls do a good job in accurately assessing both the popularity and reelection probabilities of incumbents. This holds in particular over short run, i.e., close to election, time horizons that are the relevant ones with regard to our empirical strategy. Adhering to the definition of "VP functions" in the survey by Nannestadt and Paldam (1994) , our strategy consists in conditioning VP functions of both the Bundesregierung (upper-tier government level) and the Landesregierungen, i.e., the federal states' incumbent governments (lower-tier government level) on relative performances in the outlined international (PISA) and national (PISA-E) tests. Given the nature of our data, this is, respectively, done in the framework of an event study analysis.
Upper-Tier Government
As our period of investigation at the U-level, we choose the period from the month following the election to the Bundestag in fall 1998 to the month of the first advance notice of the PISA 2009 test results in June 2010. The dotted vertical lines in Figure 2 mark the months corresponding to the three elections covered by our sample, while the vertical solid lines give the months in which the PISA test scores have been published. 8 As our proxy of reelection probabilities we consider data on stated voting intentions from the most popular popularity poll in Germany, referred to as "Sonntagsfrage." 9 The poll is run by one of the major psephological institutes in Germany. The same source of polls data (now: Infratest-dimap -then: Infratest) has been used by Kirchgässner (1985) to measure voting intentions of German voters and to estimate VP-functions of parties for the Federal Republic of Germany from 1971 to 1982. The underlying sample is representative and the poll has been conducted, at least, once a month over our period of observation. If there is more than one figure on voting intention per month, we take monthly averages of voting shares attracted by parties. In order to assess the impact of German students' relative performance in the three national PISA test results (μ n a ) on stated voting intention, we estimate a stylized Fair-type model (Fair 1978 (Fair , 1996 9 This is due to the fact that the central question in the poll reads: "Who would you vote if elections were next Sunday?". 10 The following specification disregards several central determinants of popularity discussed in voting theory, including campaigns, issues, candidates, quality of challengers, and party identification (PID). However, given scarcity of aggregate data and the notoriously good performance of Fair-type models in predicting election outcomes, we are confident to rely on a fairly good second best choice.
Public Education, Accountability, and Yardstick Competition
where j 1 ¼ 2000; 2003; j 2 ¼ 2000; 2003; 2006 , and X t denotes the fair set of conditioners made up by monthly figures of the unemployment rate, the inflation rate (computed from growth rates of the CPI), and the growth rate in real total production. Corresponding time series in monthly frequency were obtained from the German Federal Employment Agency (Bundesagentur für Arbeit) and the Federal Statistics Office (Statistisches Bundesamt). Summary statistics are given in Table 7 in the Appendix. GK t represents a dummy, taking on a value of 1 during the time of the coalition formed by the two dominating German post-war parties, CDU and SPD, i.e., during the so-called Große Koalition. As can be seen from Figure 2 , it is obviously necessary to control for this coalition due to the higher incumbent government's VP-shares after October 2005. To some degree it also controls for a change in government ideology, which Potrafke (2011a Potrafke ( , 2011b recently found to hardly have a bearing on public spending on education. For the considered period, V t corresponds to the share of voters intending to vote the incumbent government or coalition. For an event study analysis, the choice of allows us to assess whether the effect of relative performance was particularly pronounced for the early PISA tests, especially, the first one ever in 2000, compared to the later ones. The stigmatization of German education policy by the first "PISA shock" is a widely held belief (Schwager 2005; Tillmann et al. 2008) . For all three equations, we also consider as alternative specifications, the replacement of the Fair-set of conditioners with a first-order autoregressive, AR(1), part of the dependent variable V t . Estimation results are summarized in Table 3 . One may be concerned that some serious omitted variable bias plagues these estimates as central domestic and foreign-policy events and shocks were not controlled for. In particular, there were several major influential events The gain in popularity for the incumbents through this taking measures is common knowledge today. In March 2003 the second Persian Gulf War started. After a massive air strike coalition ground forces invaded Iraq. By mid-April, Saddam Hussein's army and government had collapsed. The German incumbents' corporate position against the invasion of Iraq also most probably affected its popularity. Finally, in September 2008 the financial crisis started to spread over the world with the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers, which also reasonably affected the popularity of the incumbent coalition. In event study analyses, a straightforward practice to treat exceptional and influential events simply consists of dropping these observations from the sample; see, for example, Bernanke and Kuttner (2005) . Leaving out our monthly data associated with 09/11, the Afghanistan conflict, the Elbe Flood, the Persian Gulf War, and the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers decreases our sample from 142 to 133 events. As can be seen from columns 3 and 6 in Table 3 , our results are nearly unaffected by excluding these outliers. Notes: t-Values in parentheses (Newey and West 1987) : *, **, ***significant at 10%, 5%, 1% levels. 
Lower-Tier Governments
As polls data for German Laender governments are available at discontinuous frequency only, the 16 different voting intention series at the federal state level rarely consist of more than 100 observations for our period of investigation. 12 As they are constituted of in-equidistant events at the state level, pooling the data and using within estimators that control for fixed effects are not feasible. Thus, we have to resort to state-by-state estimations to test linchpin mechanism eq. [2] of our basic model. An event study practice that has been successfully applied in similar empirical models, though in widely different contexts, is a one-stage specification with a lower order autoregressive term and a dummy variable introducing events like announcements, accidents as the Chernobyl nuclear accident, etc. For our state-level event study analysis it appears to be the appropriate one. It is followed, for example, in Kalra, Henderson, and Raines (1997) , Berman, Brooks, and Davidson (2000) , and Veraros, Kasimati, and Dawson (2004) . In analogy to the preceding section's estimates, we specify
where j In event study analyses interaction terms as, for instance, the direction (cut vs increase) or reversals of interest rate target changes by the central bank (Bernanke and Kuttner 2005) usually are of particular interest. In our case this concerns the discrepancies in average student test scores across the Laender: f i;τ denotes a binary variable that equals zero until the respective popularity poll observation which corresponds to the nearest neighbor month of, or in other words the closest following event to, each PISA-E announcement and equals 1 until the announcement of the next PISA-E result's publication or state election. Variables a i denote the average students' test scores in each PISA-E test. 14 Again, model-consistent estimates of coefficients b i require a positive sign. In analogy to the event study analysis at the national level, we use specification [8] to assess whether relative performances in PISA-E 2000 had a particularly stigmatizing effect on the incumbent governments of Laender at the time. In specification [9], we do so for PISA-E 2000 and 2003, while in specification [10] the stigmatizing effect of relative performance is assumed to be spread across all three considered PISA-E tests. Results are summarized on a state-by-state basis in the Appendix (Table 8 ). In nearly two-thirds of cases, i.e., in 10 out of the 16 states, we find indications of announcements effects by relying on specification [8] that are statistically significant at conventional levels. For specifications [9] and [10] , corresponding significant effects are found in one-fourth and about one-third of states, respectively. We can interpret b 1;i as a short-run multiplier, that is, multiplied with the relative performances (X i;τ ¼ a i;2000 À μ (Table 4) . 15 For b 2;i and b 3;i , we calculate them at the respective mean of relative performances in the considered set of tests for states i with significantly estimated announcement effects in specifications [10] and [11] , respectively (Tables 5 and 6 ). As V i;τ is expressed in percent and we measure short-run as well as long-run effects of relative performance by dV i;τ =dX i;τ À Á X i;τ and @V i;τ =@X i;τ À Á X i;τ for each state, both measures are in percentage points. For example, @V i;τ =@X i;τ À Á X i;τ ¼ þ2:7 represents a 2.7 percentage point increase of the VP function of the Bavarian incumbent government implied by an incremental increase of relative performance of Bavarian students that amounted to 24.5% of an international standard deviation (normed to 100) in PISA-E 2000. The corresponding long-run multiplier is þ 5.3 percentage points.
Similar multipliers are reported in Tables 5 and 6 for b 2;i and b 3;i , respectively. For our interpretation of the size of effects, we have to keep in mind that they refer to an incumbent government and, hence, not necessarily to a single party. As expected, PISA-E 2000 had the most stigmatizing effect on German education policy makers at the state level, inasmuch as combined relative performance and announcement effects are found in nearly two-thirds of states, ranging between −8.0 (NI) and þ4:1 (BW) percentage points. These statistically significant Salmon mechanism effects shrink to subgroups of state incumbent governments concerned by the announcement of PISA-E 2000, when we additionally consider relative performances also for PISA-E 2003 (Table 5 ). The same applies to considering all PISA-E test announcements (Table 6 ). However, both implied short-run and long-run effects are still sizable. On average, over all considered specifications significant short-run effects of relative performances cost belowaverage performing state-government incumbents 3.4 percentage points of In sum, though facing suboptimal data at the level of federal states, our event study exercises found substantial indications for the central driving mechanisms of our model. Reelection probabilities of incumbent governments both at the national and state levels, at least partially, are associated with relative performances in national and intra-national student achievement tests. 16 
Discussion and Concluding Remarks
In mid-2006 the first stage of the recent reform of German federalism (Föderalismusreform) dissolved major parts of shared decision-making in education policy of federal government and federal states. By then Germany witnessed a highly idiosyncratic hybrid form of federal governance in public education. Some fairly basic theoretical thoughts considering the two idiosyncrasies of residual rights of the federal government in the form of making proposals on the one hand and the requirement of a unanimous approval of states on the other led to a potential strategic dilemma: If both the national and subnational governmental VP functions depend on relative educational achievements, as we showed in the empirical parts of our study, a state belonging to the top flight might disapprove all-states better off policies if the catch-up of low-performance states implies even just a slight loss of its ground in the pecking order. This cynical result hinges on the federal government neither internalizing the VP functions of state incumbents in the sense of a Nash equilibrium nor considering any distributional aspects in its objective function. There are several routes to remedy this potential demerit of shared decision-making. Cutting down participatory rights of the federal government as done through the Föderalismusreform seems, given the historical development of constantly finding ways of bypassing the formal Laender autonomy in education policy, the least promising. Similarly, path dependency would not allow to turn back time and allow Germany to abstain from standardized student assessments at the national and subnational levels, as other federally organized countries do and did in the past, in order to obscure comparison and preclude yardstick competition. Also the unanimity vote requirement that proved successful in cutting down on partisan issues in the past is not disposable. Internalizing voters' preferences more directly through referendums as in the Swiss political system of direct democracy seems for similar reasons infeasible. It remains that the problem is solved simply by a repeated game structure and the learning of the players, i.e., the federal government and the federal states, to mutually internalize reaction functions. Against the backdrop of the recent experience with disapproved proposals, the paralleling of the decentralization of responsibilities with fiscal decentralization seems a promising supportive measure to avoid the sketched dilemma.
According to the fiscal federalism literature, decentralized systems, although bearing the danger of relying on bailouts (Wildasin 1997; De Mello 2000; Goodspeed 2002 ) and of implying impediments of coordination due to an increased number of veto players and political actors in general (Tsebelis 1995; Wibbels 2000) , also have several advantages. These include enhanced preference matching or local needs responsiveness (Oates 1999; Faguet 2004 ) and enhanced accountability, political participation, as well as reduced rent seeking and informal activity (Seabright 1996) . Additionally, in the traditional public choice literature fiscal decentralization fosters competition among subnational entities, tames Leviathan governments, and forces local governments to implement optimal policies in terms of technical and allocative efficiency (Tiebout 1956; Brennan and Buchanan 1980; Baskaran 2010; . Public Education, Accountability, and Yardstick Competition
